歐元，貨幣政策的財政緊湊的設計
演辭，歐洲央行行長德拉基，
路德維希艾哈德講座，
2011年12月15日，柏林
女士們，先生們，
我很榮幸能收到邀請提供今年的路德維希艾哈德講座教授漢斯蒂特邁爾。
當我在20世紀 90年代在意大利財政部工作，我蒂特邁爾和教授一起工作的許多機會。我清楚地記得在“馬斯特里赫特條約”以來的二十年的過程中，我們的許多交流。我非常感謝他作為顧問，我們的審計委員會與歐洲央行（ECB）保持密切聯繫。
讓我也表達我的感激之情的Ludwig - Erhard基金會的活動，支持“Soziale Marktwirtschaft”的原則，歐洲各地知名。
路德維希艾哈德在塑造德國戰後恢復遺留的延伸遠遠超出了他自己的國家，遠遠超出了他自己的時代。他的“社會市場經濟”的理念，是有遠見的。 ，甚至舉行有關央行行長珍惜意見，強調價格穩定的重要性：“模具soziale Marktwirtschaft IST ohne eine konsequente Politik DER Preisstabilität - 編者 denkbar。”我認為，今天，我們不能制定這個想法。
路德維希艾哈德還供奉了中央銀行的獨立性原則。當在20世紀 50年代初的德國中央銀行制度的獨立性尚未解決，他認為，作為經濟部長，政府不應該發出指示，向中央銀行。大家都知道，歐洲央行的法規繼承了這一重要原則，中央銀行的獨立性和價格穩定的可信的追求齊頭並進。
目前的情況下仍然要求深深的挑戰交織在許多國家的政治水平和超國家的歐洲領域的經濟，金融和財政問題，。
上週已採取了兩套重要的決定，這是今天我的發言重點。首先，我將詳細闡述了貨幣政策措施，歐洲央行上週四宣布，我們期望從他們那裡的動機。第二，我也想與大家分享上週的歐洲理事會首腦會議的決定，這帶來了一些非常重要的新的元素，我們的經濟和貨幣聯盟的一些看法。
歐元區貨幣政策的決策
為了解釋我們最近的貨幣政策措施，讓我記得，在歐元區經濟對銀行的特殊作用。工程主要是通過銀行信貸在歐元區的企業和家庭的流動。近年來，企業的外部融資約三季度來自該源。
這意味著任何銀行貸款的渠道減值，將有更強的後果比其他經濟體，企業的外部融資時主要是從企業債券市場在歐元區。
在歐元區的銀行最近受到壓力，既至於他們的資本基礎和其資助的條件。
計劃，以加強其資本基礎，是企圖以加強其在金融市場中的地位，但是這不是一個簡單的過程。基本上有三個銀行的選項，以追求提高其資本比率由歐洲銀行管理局的要求：他們可以提高其資本水平，出售資產或減少其向實體經濟提供信貸。
第一個選項是比第二個好很多，和第二個選項是遠遠比第三更好。但是，提高資本水平是昂貴的，在低迷的市場，面臨著來自股東的阻力。出售資產是不太可取，削減信貸向實體經濟更是雪上加霜。因此，公共當局應，以減輕對實體經濟和銀行的影響，應考慮限制股息及專案補償，以加強緩衝區。
銀行也面臨著在金融市場籌集較長期資金的問題。其資金的縮短導致在打開的那種，造成金融危機的資產負債表的期限錯配。與此同時，抵押物的短缺開始出現，尤其是中小型銀行在金融體系的某些環節。
除了識別在銀行業的這些特殊菌株，我們定期經濟和貨幣分析表明，加劇了金融市場的緊張局勢繼續抑制歐元區經濟活動前景仍然受到高度的不確定性和大幅下滑的風險。在這樣的環境中，在歐元區的成本，工資和價格的壓力應該保持謙虛，在政策相關的地平線。與此同時，貨幣擴張的基本步伐仍然疲弱。
在這種情況下，並忠實於我們的任務是保持中期價格穩定，歐洲央行理事會已經採取了一些深遠影響的決定。
理事會決定，以減少其關鍵利率25個基點至1％。在正常的金融市場條件下，降低利率政策是一個有力的手段控制通貨膨脹和需求的支持。降息的方式通過財務回報向下調整的長鏈。在該進程的結束，大範圍的證券的收益率下降，並促進基礎廣泛的寬鬆的貨幣政策。
在目前的條件下，這個過程會受到阻礙，使本身就是一個降息的影響減弱。銀行同業及其他潛在的更廣泛的經濟，限制了他們的貸款和預防的現金餘額為自我保險持有。
因此，理事會上週決定對三個其他措施，其中每個提供額外的支持，以實現必要的貨幣政策向實體經濟的衝動。
當前包應切實感受到，在金融部門和實體經濟在今後幾週和幾個月。當然，對由去槓桿化產生了濃厚的逆風。
我們建立了非常三年到期的長期再融資操作。這一期限是在歐洲央行的貨幣政策操作的新穎性。
央行提供信貸的延伸很長的到期，是為了給銀行不再地平線在其流動性規劃。它可以幫助他們避免重新平衡其資產和負債的到期日，經過一個較長期的貸款比例縮小。順便說一下，我們要絕對清楚地表明，在目前的條件下，系統性風險嚴重阻礙了經濟的運作，我們可以看到連接到中央銀行信貸規定的使用沒有恥辱：要使用我們的設施。
銀行將能夠進行再融資與歐元體系的長期貸款，從而保持其長期暴露到實體經濟。第一年後，銀行將不得不終止操作的選項。因此，他們可以靈活地適應不斷變化的流動性狀況和正常化的市場環境。
我們的第二項措施將允許銀行使用歐元體系的抵押品的貸款，從而解凍銀行資產的很大一部分。它還應提供銀行放棄削減信貸的經濟，並避免其資產負債表上其他資產的消防銷售激勵。
這些措施的目的是要確保美國家庭和企業 - 特別是小型和中小型企業 - 在當前形勢下的信貸將獲得盡可能有效。當然，我們必須仔細屏幕上的抵押品，以保護我們的資產負債表。
我們上週公佈的第三項措施是減少所需的儲備比例從 2％至1％。這項措施釋放了約 100億歐元銀行業的流動性。 ，這在需要的儲備減少，應與其他措施一起，幫助恢復貨幣市場的活動和貸款。
你會注意到我反复提到小型和中小型企業。提請你注意這些企業的理由是，他們是我們經濟的重要組成部分，佔約 70％，在歐元區的就業和所有企業的營業額的60％。我們認為，上週四推出的措施將提供本部門的支持，也間接支持急需的投資，經濟增長和就業。
一個穩定的經濟和貨幣聯盟的基礎
我現在我的注意力轉移到上週的歐洲理事會首腦會議。超過 12年，歐洲經濟和貨幣聯盟一直困擾國家預算的擔憂。在一個共同貨幣區，在正常情況下，個別國家的財政政策通常面對金融市場的壓力較小。正是基於此，一開始就在歐洲單一貨幣的穩定和增長公約“成立的目的是提供一個財政政策的控制機制的原因。
明年，歐元區作為一個整體將有一個政府主要預算赤字接近零。與此相比，在國內生產總值的5％左右預計在日本，英國和美國的主要赤字。
然而，實施的穩定和增長公約“還沒有足夠好。正如德國聯邦總理最近說，該條約已被打破過去 12年的60倍。因此，我們顯然有工作做，以防止再次發生這種情況。
這是由歐洲議會今年早些時候批准 - - 稱為六包的經濟和財政監督的新規則，必將加強實施細則。但是，儘管這些變化正在計劃，整個財政的凝聚力和歐元區的公信力被削弱。
現在，我們已經開始重新設計歐洲的三個方面的財政框架的過程中。
首先在於同有關國家，他們將建立一個健全的政策。我相信，他們現在在正確的軌道，他們是在堅決執行預算鞏固。不可避免的短期收縮可以減輕恢復信心。但在中期，可持續的增長可以達到只有進行深刻的結構性改革已拖延太久。
應對危機的第二大支柱，包括重新設計了在歐元區，我所謂的財政緊湊的財政治理。財政緊湊，是一個根本的規則，國家預算政策應該是主體，以獲得毋庸置疑的公信力重述。
上週的首腦會議上承諾，供奉在這些規則的主要立法。他們預見，每年的結構性赤字不得超過名義國內生產總值的0.5％。歐元區成員國將實施這樣的規則在本國的法律框架在憲法層面，因此，它有可能避免過度赤字，才出現的，而不是試圖控制他們後，他們已經出現。預防勝於治療。
規則也將預見偏差的情況下自動糾錯機制。此外，各國領導人同意上年度減少債務的數值基準，以降低債務水平。他們還同意，將自動適用於歐元區成員國的赤字為 3％的參考價值違反制裁。
歐洲法院可能會被要求確認在國家一級執行這些規則。
兩者合計，我相信，這些決定是可信強勁的歐元區公共財政的。
但是，恢復金融市場的信心，也需要投資者可以放心，政府債務將永遠償還和及時的服務。希臘將仍然是一個獨特的情況下，和一個可靠的穩定機制，防火牆，將在需要時受到適當的條件，可以激活。領導人明確同意評估，明年3月的防火牆是否足夠。其目的是解決金融的穩定，尤其是不同的主權債務市場之間傳染的風險威脅。
領導人決定部署在最早的時機，充分利用歐洲金融穩定基金（EFSF）。同時，他們一致認為，EFSF的繼任者，歐洲穩定機制，應該由2012年7月生效。
這是非常重要的EFSF設備齊全，並盡快投入使用。考慮到這一點的目標，上週四，理事會決定，歐洲央行隨時準備採取行動，其技術基礎設施和技術訣竅作為代理人進行市場運作的EFSF。
結論
最後，我想。歐洲理事會首腦會議的決定，連同歐洲議會最近批准的六塊，是一個明確的財政規則，在我們的貨幣聯盟的突破。
然而，危機尚未結束。現在重要的是不要失去勢頭，並迅速執行放回當然，歐元區經濟已採取的所有這些決定。
貨幣政策措施，由上週的歐洲央行理事會將支持歐元區經濟在向企業和家庭信貸流動。
路德維希艾哈德面臨的情況比我們今天所面臨的的困難得多。儘管如此，他仍然能夠通過富有挑戰性的目前看，努力構築未來，他從來沒有懷疑過會更加美好。歐洲決策者可能由他的風格中得到啟發：“書齋斯特羅姆 DER時代週報 können WIR zwar - 編者 lenken，ABER WIR werden unser希夫sicher steuern。
非常感謝您的關注。
The euro, monetary policy and the design of a fiscal compact
Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB,
Ludwig Erhard Lecture,
Berlin, 15 December 2011
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am honoured to have received the invitation from Professor Hans Tietmeyer to deliver this year’s Ludwig Erhard lecture.
When I was working at the Italian Treasury in the 1990s, Professor Tietmeyer and I had many opportunities to work together. I vividly remember many of our exchanges over the course of the two decades since the Maastricht Treaty. And I am very grateful that he remains in close contact with the European Central Bank (ECB) as adviser to our audit committee.
Let me also express my gratitude to the Ludwig-Erhard-Foundation whose activities in support of the principles of “Soziale Marktwirtschaft” are renowned across Europe.
Ludwig Erhard’s legacy in shaping Germany’s post-war recovery stretches far beyond his own country and far beyond his own times. His conception of the social market economy was visionary. And he even held cherished views about central bankers, stressing the importance of price stability: “Die soziale Marktwirtschaft ist ohne eine konsequente Politik der Preisstabilität nicht denkbar.” I think we cannot formulate this idea any better today.
Ludwig Erhard also helped to enshrine the principle of central bank independence. When in the early 1950s the independence of the German central bank system was not yet settled, he as minister of the economy argued that the government should not issue instructions to the central bank. You all know that the statutes of the ECB inherited this important principle and that central bank independence and the credible pursuit of price stability go hand in hand.
Current circumstances remain demanding, with economic, financial and fiscal issues deeply intertwined with challenges at the political level in many countries and in the supra-national European sphere.
Last week two sets of important decisions have been taken, which are going to be the focus of my remarks today. First, I will elaborate on the motivation for the monetary policy measures that the ECB announced last Thursday and what we expect from them. Second, I would also like to share with you some views on last week’s European Council summit’s decisions, which brought some very important new elements to our economic and monetary union.
Monetary policy decisions for the euro area
To explain our recent monetary policy measures, let me recall the particular role of banks in the euro area economy. The flow of credit to firms and households in the euro area works largely through banks. During recent years, about three quarters of firms’ external financing have come from that source.
This means that any impairment in the bank lending channel will have stronger consequences in the euro area than in other economies where firms’ external financing comes largely from corporate bond markets.
Banks in the euro area have recently come under pressure both as regards their capital bases and their funding conditions.
The plan to strengthen their capital bases is an attempt to reinforce their standing in financial markets, but this is not an easy process. There are essentially three options for banks to pursue to raise their capital ratios as demanded by the European Banking Authority: they can raise their capital levels, sell assets or reduce their provision of credit to the real economy.
The first option is much better than the second, and the second option is much better than the third. But raising capital levels is expensive in a depressed market and faces resistance from shareholders. Selling assets is less preferable and curtailing credit to the real economy is even worse. Therefore, public authorities ought to cushion the impact on the real economy and banks should consider restraining dividends and ad hoc compensation to strengthen buffers.
Banks are also facing problems in raising longer-term funding in financial markets. The resulting shortening of their funding leads in turn to maturity mismatches on balance sheets of the kind that caused the financial crisis. At the same time, shortages of collateral are beginning to emerge in some segments of the financial system especially for the small and medium sized banks.
In addition to identifying these particular strains in the banking sector, our regular economic and monetary analysis has indicated that the intensified financial market tensions continue to dampen economic activity in the euro area and the outlook remains subject to high uncertainty and substantial downside risks. In such an environment, cost, wage and price pressures in the euro area should remain modest over the policy-relevant horizon. At the same time, the underlying pace of monetary expansion remains subdued.
In these conditions, and faithful to our mandate to maintain price stability over the medium term, the ECB’s Governing Council has taken a number of far-reaching decisions.
The Council decided to reduce its key interest rates by another 25 basis points to 1%. In normal financial market conditions, a policy rate reduction is a potent instrument of inflation control and demand support. The rate cut works its way through a long chain of downward adjustments in financial returns. At the end of the process, the yield on large spectrum of securities declines and promotes broad-based policy accommodation.
In the present conditions, this process turns out to be hampered, so that the impact of a rate cut by itself is weakened. Banks limit their lending to other banks and potentially to the broader economy, and they hold on to precautionary balances of cash as self-insurance.
Therefore, the Governing Council last week decided on three other measures, each of which provides additional support in order to bring the necessary monetary policy impulse to the real economy.
The current package should be felt tangibly in the financial sector and the real economy over the coming weeks and months. Of course, it comes against strong headwinds generated by deleveraging.
We established very long-term refinancing operations with a maturity of three years. This duration is a novelty in ECB monetary policy operations.
The extension of central bank credit provision to very long maturities is meant to give banks a longer horizon in their liquidity planning. It helps them to avoid rebalancing the maturities of their assets and liabilities through a downscaling of longer-term lending. Incidentally, we want to make it absolutely clear that in the present conditions where systemic risk is seriously hampering the functioning of the economy, we see no stigma attached to the use of central banking credit provisions: our facilities are there to be used.
Banks will be able to refinance term lending with the Eurosystem and thus preserve their long-term exposures to the real economy. After the first year, banks will have the option to terminate the operation. So they can flexibly adapt to changing liquidity conditions and a normalising market environment.
Our second measure will allow banks to use loans as collateral with the Eurosystem, thereby unfreezing a large portion of bank assets. It should also provide banks with an incentive to abstain from curtailing credit to the economy and to avoid fire-sales of other assets on their balance sheets.
The goal of these measures is to ensure that households and firms – and especially small and medium-sized enterprises – will receive credit as effectively as possible under the current circumstances. Of course, we have to screen the collateral carefully so as to protect our balance sheet.
The third measure we announced last week is to reduce the required reserves ratio from 2% to 1%. This measure frees up liquidity of the banking sector by about 100 billion euro. Along with other measures, this reduction in the reserve requirements should, too, help revive money market activity and lending.
You will notice that I referred repeatedly to small and medium-sized enterprises. The reason for drawing your attention to these businesses is that they are a significant part of our economy, accounting for about 70% of employment in the euro area and 60% of the turnover of all firms. We believe that the measures introduced last Thursday will provide support for this sector and indirectly also support much-needed investment, growth and employment.
Foundations for a stable economic and monetary union
Let me now shift my attention to last week’s European Council summit. For more than 12 years, Europe’s economic and monetary union has been haunted by concerns about national budgets. Within a common currency area during normal times, the fiscal policies of individual countries typically face less pressure from financial markets. It was for this reason that at the very beginning of Europe’s single currency, the Stability and Growth Pact was established to provide a control mechanism for fiscal policy.
Next year, the euro area as a whole will have a government primary budget deficit close to zero. This compares with primary deficits projected at around 5% of GDP in Japan, the UK and the US.
Yet the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact has not been good enough. As the Federal Chancellor of Germany recently remarked, the Pact has been broken 60 times over the past 12 years. So we clearly have work to do to prevent this happening again.
The new set of rules for economic and fiscal surveillance known as the six-pack – which was approved by the European Parliament earlier this year – will certainly strengthen the implementation of the rules. But while these changes were being planned, the entire fiscal cohesion and credibility of the euro area was weakened.
We have now begun the process of re-designing Europe’s fiscal framework on three fronts.
The first lies with the countries concerned: they have to put their policies back on a sound footing. I believe that they are now on the right track and they are right in implementing budgetary consolidation resolutely. The unavoidable short-term contraction may be mitigated by the return of confidence. But in the medium term, sustainable growth can be achieved only by undertaking deep structural reforms that have been procrastinated for too long.
The second pillar of a response to the crisis consists of a re-design of the fiscal governance in the euro area, what I called the fiscal compact. The fiscal compact is a fundamental restatement of the rules to which national budgetary policies ought to be subject so as to gain credibility beyond doubt.
Last week’s summit committed to enshrine these rules in the primary legislation. They will foresee that the annual structural deficit should not exceed 0.5% of nominal GDP. Euro area Member States will implement such a rule in their national legal frameworks at a constitutional level, so that it is possible to avoid excessive deficits before they arise, rather than trying to control them after they have emerged. Prevention is better than cure.
Rules will also foresee an automatic correction mechanism in case of deviation. Moreover, the leaders agreed on a numerical benchmark for annual debt reduction to bring down debt levels. They also agreed to sanctions that will apply automatically to euro area Member States in breach of the 3% reference value for deficits.
The European Court of Justice may be asked to verify the implementation of these rules at national level.
Taken together, I believe that these decisions are capable of making public finances in the euro area credibly robust.
But restoring financial markets’ confidence also requires that investors be reassured that government debt will always be repaid and timely serviced. Greece will remain a unique case, and a credible stabilisation mechanism, a firewall, will be in place and can be activated when needed subject to proper conditionality. The leaders unambiguously agreed to assess the adequacy of the firewall by next March. Its objective is to address the threats to financial stability, and especially the risk of contagion between different sovereign debt markets.
The leaders decided to deploy the leveraging of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) at the earliest opportunity. At the same time they agreed that the EFSF’s successor, the European Stability Mechanism, should come into force by July 2012.
It is crucial that the EFSF be fully equipped and be made operational as soon as possible. With this goal in mind, last Thursday, the Governing Council decided that the ECB would stand ready to act with its technical infrastructure and know-how as an agent for the EFSF in carrying out its market operations.
Conclusion
Let me conclude. The decisions of the European Council summit, together with the six-pack approved recently by the European Parliament, are a breakthrough for clear fiscal rules in our monetary union.
However, the crisis has not ended yet. It is now important not to lose momentum and to swiftly implement all those decisions that have been taken to put the euro area economy back on course.
The monetary policy measures taken last week by the ECB’s Governing Council will support the flow of credit to firms and households in the euro area economy.
Ludwig Erhard faced a situation that was much more difficult than what we face today. Still, he was able to look through the challenging present and to work hard to build a future that he never doubted would be brighter. The European policy makers might well be inspired by his style: “Den Strom der Zeit können wir zwar nicht lenken, aber wir werden unser Schiff sicher steuern.”
Thank you very much for your attention.
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2011/html/sp111215.en.html
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